From the Greek, meaning "good or easy death" (i.e., without severe suffering), euthanasia is commonly defined as the participation of a physician in an intentional, deliberate act to cause the immediate death of a person with a terminal, incurable or painful disease by the medical administration of a lethal drug. [Source: Junkerman, LJ and Schiedermayer, DL, Practical Ethics for Students, Interns, and Residents: A Short Reference Manual (Frederick, Md: University Publishing Group, 1994).] From the legal perspective, euthanasia can be defined as an affirmative act by a physician causing death, committed with benign or altruistic motives, with or without the consent of the patient, and should be distinguished from physician-assisted suicide [See Furrow, BR, Greaney, TL, Johnson, JH, et al., Health Law: Cases, Materials and Problems, 3rd ed. (St. Paul: West Group, 1997), 1188]. One source of confusion is the fact that the withdrawal of treatment is often referred to as passive euthanasia in the literature, whereas the affirmative act is referred to as active euthanasia. This distinction tends to be more confusing than helpful, insofar as there is no significant moral difference between active and passive euthanasia—at least from the Catholic perspective.
In the Catholic Tradition, euthanasia is defined as "any action or omission, which of itself or by intention causes death, in order that all suffering may in this way be eliminated. Euthanasia’s terms of reference, therefore, are to be found in the intention of the will and in the methods used" (Declaration on Euthanasia). Though the practice of euthanasia is strictly forbidden in the Catholic Tradition, it must be distinguished from the refusal of "over-zealous" treatment—i.e., an acknowledgement of the natural limits and finitude of human life, or acceptance of the human condition in the face of death (Evangelium Vitae
, nn. 64-66, 89). In light of the passive/active distinction, this definition can lead to some confusion about the moral status of discontinuing life-sustaining medical interventions. However, the omission of a treatment that no longer offers a reasonable hope of benefit or that is disproportionately burdensome relative to its benefits, even when death is foreseen as one outcome, is not to be confused with euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide, and can be distinguished through the principle of double effect and the principle of proportionate/disproportionate means. (See also, Ethical and Religious Directives, Part Five, n. 60
.)
